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Vacillations around a Pension Reform Trajectory: time for a 
change? 
 
Platon Tinios# 
 
ABSTRACT 
Discussion of pensions in Greece displays a paradox: reform is 
universally acknowledged to be important, urgent and mature, yet 
the political class avoid and postpone all discussion. This results in a 
syncopated reform path. A historical overview indicates that reforms 
are best understood as interrupted and unsuccessful attempts to 
complete the original blueprint for the pension system which was 
formulated in the 1930s.  These define a reform trajectory around 
which there exist centrifugal forces pulling away (cross-subsidies), 
and homeostatic mechanisms bringing back on track (public 
finance). Thus, the original 1930s design is implicitly accepted as a 
maximal aim of reform, while the question of its appropriateness is 
never raised.  This analysis explains reform failures by problems in 
the content and preparation of reforms, rather than on the strength 
of opposition (which, in any case, was highly predictable).  A fresh 
start, provided there is adequate preparation, is a possible way out 
of the impasse. 
 
Keywords: Greece; History of the welfare state; Social Security; Pension 
reforms.  
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Vacillations around a Pension Reform Trajectory: time for a 
change? 
 
 
1. A Perennially Open Reform 
The year 2007 was to usher in a major pension reform in the next year, or, so 
the Government had solemnly declared.  The stirrings of a social dialogue were 
in place, a committee having been formed in the usual way. Yet, and in contrast 
to a tendency to mark the passing of even minor events, two anniversaries 
crucial for social security were allowed to pass in guilty silence. First, and most 
importantly, was the 70th anniversary of the operation of the major social 
insurance fund, IKA, marking the beginnings of modern social insurance in the 
country. A short piece in a newspaper was the only remembrance of the start of 
modern social insurance in December 19371. Second, October was the 10th 
anniversary of the publication of the ‘Spraos Report’ (Spraos Committee, 
1997). The report had shocked public opinion by arguing forcefully that 
decisions had to be taken to meet both current and future problems; it had 
mentioned that the structure of the social insurance problem facing the country 
was such that ‘it had until 2007 to decide’, in the sense that dramatic 
deteriorations were expected to occur around that date2. 
                                                 
1
 Tinios (2007) a comment in Eleftheros Typos daily newspaper (3 December 2007). 
2
 That ‘time of reckoning’ or else ‘closing of the window of opportunity’ (sic) was postponed by the 
large immigration flows. See Tinios (2003) for details. For the Spraos Committee and its reception see 
Featherstone et al (2001). 
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Both anniversaries would have been ideal opportunities to ponder over the 
effectiveness of the social protection system as a whole. Yet, both anniversaries 
were resolutely ignored. In October 2009, the 75th anniversary of the 20th 
century’s major social insurance legislation (Law 6298/1934) met a similar 
reception. When faced with pension issues, the political class exhibited, once 
again, a preference not to think or argue, an inability to explain motives and 
answer for choices, a guilty prescience that the same mistakes were about to be 
repeated.  
A further vignette adds to the flavour of official and public attitudes. In March 
2009 the ‘Excellence Group’ of Experts under the Prime Minister’s adviser on 
Public sector reform released their first report. The experts had collected, 
through a process of brainstorming, the 26 ‘most pressing and feasible reforms’ 
facing Greece. The reforms were ranked by a process of decentralised voting 
where each expert awarded a 1 for the most urgent reform and on to 26 for the 
least urgent and/or feasible reform. “Social insurance reform with social 
sensitivity” scraped in at number 25, just above the last reform which was 
“Recycling of refuse”.3 
Yet, official publications of independent bodies (Bank of Greece, EU etc) 
concur on a list of pension woes which can be summarised under five headings.  
The Greek pension system: 
                                                 
3
 Axiotis Group (2008). In a letter to the press, the chairman of the group makes clear that the low rank 
is a result of the absence of the administrative prerequisites for reform, hence clearly placing an 
emphasis on ‘feasibility’ rather than ‘urgency’. 
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1. Is Costly.  Currently pensions absorb more than 12% of GDP (OECD 
2007). 
2. It faces dramatic demographic challenges. The dependency ratio is 
expected to deteriorate at the second fastest rate amongst the EU-15, 
while Greece faced the highest expected pension expenditure in 2050, 
almost a quarter of GDP. 
3. It is economically inefficient.  A multitude of separate providers and 
special regimes leads to a patchwork of cross-subsidisation and  non-
wage costs. The private sector and exports shoulder the brunt of the cost 
while the public sector retains its privileges. 
4. It is socially ineffective.  Official reports admit that ‘poverty is grey in 
colour’. Old age poverty is some 50% greater than for working age 
groups. Once the population shifts from the vicissitudes of the 
globalised labour markets to the bosom of the Welfare State, their risk of 
poverty appears to increase (Lyberaki & Tinios 2007). 
5. It is resistant to change. At least since 1990 the pension system is 
under threat of a major reform which is always postponed, in a perennial 
‘Reform by Instalments’ (Tinios, 2005).  Nevertheless, the system 
architecture remains substantially that of the Founding Act of social 
insurance in 1934. 
It is thus not surprising that in lists of urgent reforms compiled outside 
domestic political constraints (e.g. Bank of Greece, OECD, EU), the reform of 
pensions is ranked very near the top.  Only months after the Minister of 
  4 
Employment declared that the latest instalment of March 2008 had ‘solved the 
problem for a generation’, the Bank of Greece is asking for more (Bank of 
Greece, 2009) as is the OECD (OECD 2009).  
This paper focuses on the paradox of reform proposals, which are urgent and 
mature; yet, the political class is doing its best to deny. The first aim is to 
explain the syncopated nature of the reform progress. The paper argues that 
reforms over the last half-century are best understood as piecemeal attempts to 
implement and complete the original blueprint for the pension system 
formulated in the 1930s. The course of reform is seen as a series of interrupted 
attempts to implement a given and unchanging target system. These define a 
trajectory around which there exist centrifugal forces pulling away, and 
homeostatic mechanisms bringing back on track. This analysis serves as a 
prologue for the second aim of the paper: the absence of real discussion of 
pension issues is attributed to the implicit and unquestioned acceptance that the 
appropriate course is simply to implement the original design of the pension 
system. Little thought is devoted to whether a 75-year old blue-print remains 
appropriate. This impasse signals the importance of fresh start in pensions 
discussions. Discussions need to move away from ‘how to fix the old system?’ 
on to ‘how to cope with problems of the future?’. 
  5 
2. The Political Economy Approach: vacillations around a reform 
trajectory 
The Greek Social protection system marks in 2009 the 75th anniversary of its 
founding charter, Law 6298 of 19344.  The formulation and passing of this law 
was by no means easy: it was associated with the demise of two centre-left 
governments and was finally passed as a compromise by a Popular Party 
government in 19345. The 1934 law replaced an earlier law (L5733/1932, 
passed yet never implemented), which had met determined opposition by the 
medical profession, trade unions and the pre-existing occupational pension 
funds. The central issue at stake was the fate of the pre-existing funds: would 
they be consolidated into a unitary social insurance body, which would cover 
the entire population – as both economic theory and the blueprint composed by 
the League of Nations experts had intended? Or, would the separate pre-
existing funds be allowed to continue – as the ‘social partners’ of the time 
preferred?  The law that finally passed was a compromise between these 
positions – a compromise that is still shaping the landscape of social insurance 
75 years later6. 
Law 6298/1934 led to the opening of the first two IKA offices in Athens and 
Thessaloniki in 1937 (by the Metaxas dictatorship). Implementation was 
interrupted in the 1940s and social insurance was restarted by Law 1846 of 
                                                 
4
 The Appendix (II) provides a chronology of social insurance in Greece in tabular form. 
5
 For an impassioned analysis of the passage of the law and the compromises that led to it, see Tsalikis 
(2008) – a translation in Greek of a PhD dissertation defended at the LSE in April 1967.  Liakos (1993) 
covers the same ground. Also, Agallopoulos (1955), pp18-31. 
6
 See Papantoniou (1963) for an insightful early analysis of the IKA law. Also Tsalikis (2008), chap7. 
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1951. Nevertheless what Tinios (2008) calls the “Founding Vision of IKA” 
retained its three central characteristics: 
First, IKA as the backbone and central pillar of a universal PAYG state system 
of social insurance – founded on building up rights through the payment of 
contributions by employers and employees. 
Second, the functional links between short-term benefits such as health with 
more long-term benefits such as pensions. Health benefits constituted a visible 
and immediate improvement motivating the payment towards the more distant 
(and ultimately more important) pension benefits. 
Third, and most crucially, the evolutionary implementation of the first two 
characteristics. Rather than enforcing obligatory consolidation of all employees 
in IKA, the law allowed their gradual integration over time.  Integration was 
expected to proceed gradually: geographically (IKA spread from the major 
urban centres outwards over the following 2-3 decades) and, most crucially, 
occupationally (by incorporating pre-existing occupational funds). IKA was 
designed to operate as the centre of gravity and the pole of attraction of the 
overall system, attracting occupational groups on the strength of its better 
benefits and surer financing. 
It is clear from much of the early discussions of the matter (see e.g. 
Agallopoulos 1955) that this process of consolidation was expected to proceed 
to its final conclusion relatively swiftly.  Fragmentation was thus treated as a 
  7 
transitory problem that was adequately dealt with.  Yet, two generations later, 
most analysts cite it as the defining characteristic of the Greek social insurance 
picture (Petmesidou 1991; Börsch-Supan and Tinios, 2001; Featherstone and 
Tinios 2001). The number of separate social insurance funds from 153 in 1956 
peaked at 325 in 1997 (Tinios 2001); consolidation since then has concentrated 
on administrative changes, whilst retaining the differences in the insurance 
terms offered to separate occupational groups within the same entity. It is 
notable that, even within IKA, in 1997 85% of new pension applications were 
able to cite some more favourable ‘exception’ to the rules; only some 15% 
unfortunates had to make do with the general rules (Tinios 2003, p 62). This 
process of obscuring differentiation by folding pension funds within wider 
units was continued by the most recent law, Law 3655 of 20087. 
All in all, one cannot but agree that the evolutionary process of consolidation 
foreseen in the IKA vision proved a resounding failure. An official Ministry of 
Coordination report, composed in 1958, concludes that there exists “absolute 
inequality of protection so that the constitutional principle on citizens’ equality 
has been totally forgotten” (Ministry of Coordination, 1959), an estimation that 
forty years later is still considered a commonplace (Marinos et al, 2007). Social 
insurance reform remains on the agenda in 2009, while it makes its 
reappearance with equal urgency and regular periodicity. 
                                                 
7
 In the majority of cases the 2008 law consolidates the management of funds, retaining all separate 
social insurance terms and even keeping separate accounts. 
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Thus there are three aspects to be explained: First the delay and ultimate failure 
of the evolutionary process foreseen at the start of the ‘IKA Vision’. Second, 
the syncopated nature of serial pension reform – where pension discussions 
return with apparently equal force. Third, the periodicity and cyclical nature of 
the reform episodes.  The mechanism proposed to explain this process involves 
a central reform trajectory mapped out in the IKA vision, whose object was to 
complete matters left undone in 1934. Around this trajectory operate, on the 
one hand,  centrifugal forces pulling away from the reform path and, on the 
other hand, homeostatic mechanisms attempting to restore the reform path.  A 
key feature is the relative impermeability of the whole process, which simply 
repeats itself regularly. This syncopated political process of reform was 
described by Tinios (2008b) as ‘ostrich interventionism’ – viz. episodes of 
denial of the existence of a problem interrupted by frantic activity leading to 
the passage of a law. These matters will now be considered in turn. 
The centrifugal forces were embedded in the mechanism at the very start of 
the evolutionary process and are innate to it. A decision to proceed gradually 
created the conditions for a ‘prolonged immaturity8’ of the system as a whole.  
As social insurance spread progressively through the population (at both the 
extensive and intensive margins9), it generated current surpluses as the stock of 
                                                 
8
 In social insurance systems expanding coverage leads to an immediate increase in contributions which 
is transformed into greater expenditure as new pensioners gradually claim the new benefits.  In such 
‘immature’ systems there will be current operating surpluses even if the long term (actuarial) balance is 
heavily negative. 
9
 Borrowing the terms from D. Ricardo, the extensive margin would involve the spread of social 
insurance in the population; the intensive the addition of new layers of protection.  The end of the 
extensive margin came in 1998 with the payment of contributions by the farmers.  The edges of the 
intensive margin were explored by auxiliary pension coverage, separation payments within 
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contributors outweighed the flow of new benefits (which needed time to build 
up). The existence of surpluses (combined with lax actuarial control10) created 
euphoric conditions in which to spend the cash generated. 
Pension arrangements thus placed in the hands of governments a valuable 
‘governance tool’. Denial of the use of that tool in the 1960s and 1970s seemed 
at the time impractical and perhaps even irresponsible, by placing distant 
interests above immediate and worthy priorities. The process was legitimized 
by what might be called ‘Second best economics’, and ‘second best politics’.  
Second best economics involved pragmatic solution to medium term problems. 
Such were the use of social surpluses from the 1950s to 1970s to finance 
industrial development. Less easily defensible, yet no less widespread, was the 
use of cross-subsidies to aid particular sectors11. In a similar vein, ‘second best 
politics’ would involve pragmatic solutions to pressing political problems by 
accommodating groups through ‘special dispensations’12, often hidden in the 
small print of otherwise incomprehensible legislation.  A key problem of 
second best solutions in economics is known to be the entrenchment of the 
conditions preventing the first best, or their persistence long after the distortion 
necessitating them has ceased to hold.  In the case of pensions, fragmentation 
                                                                                                                                            
occupational groups, whereas consolidation of protection between occupational groups usually leads to 
improvement in coverage. 
10
 Tinios (2010a) relates how Greek accounting standards allowed public enterprises to hand out 
pension privileges, to justify them as social policy and evade any notion of budget constraint.  
11
 Börsch-Supan and Tinios (2003). Tinios (2008) defends the practice of diverting social insurance 
surpluses to industry as within the spirit of the time. Nevertheless, a more transparent mechanism 
would undoubtedly have served both social insurance and industrial investment better. 
12
 E.g. a favourite way to avoid incomes policies was to secure pension privileges or contribution 
holidays for favoured groups – e.g. civil servants were excused their contributions in the 1950s. Bank 
employees’ contributions were paid by employers as a result of collective bargaining in the 1980s. Both 
privileges were rescinded by Law 1902/90.  For a review of the period  as a whole see Kazakos (2001). 
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and the ability to strike separate deals were put to use by governments, 
elevating in this way pension arrangements as a key instrument in clientelistic 
politics.  At the heat of decisions, most governments excused themselves from 
remembering that the ‘resourceful solution’ to their immediate problems 
exacerbated the fragmentation of the social insurance system and moved it 
further away from the attainment of the evolutionary attainment of the IKA 
vision.  
The system was not totally derailed due to the operation of homeostatic 
mechanisms which favoured the return to the original goal.  Any social 
insurance system implies the existence of ‘guardians’ – i.e. cadres aware of the 
long term importance of the completion of the evolutionary project. Such 
individuals should play the part of ‘whistle blowers’ when the long term is 
mortgaged to immediate concerns. Indeed, the ‘first generation’ of social 
insurance operatives were keenly aware of the importance of the completion of 
the project and the need to consolidate13. The Ministry of Coordination 
published an influential report in 1958 (Ministry of Coordination 1959). Some 
of the same people worked on a blueprint of social protection reform in the 
politically troubled times of the sixties. The imposition of the dictatorship 
interrupted their work, while their excellent report was published without 
attribution of authorship by the Royal Research Institute in 197014. The tail end 
                                                 
13
 The early history of social insurance did not yet display the shortcomings that Sotiropoulos (2007) 
mentions as characteristics of public administration.  Social insurance was lucky to be served in its first 
steps by people such as E. Papantoniou, P.Tsoukatos, F.Hatzidimitriou and others.  The political 
contribution of Y.Pesmazoglou was as a beneficial influence in the early steps of social insurance.  
14
 Royal Research Institute (1970). This report was the first to treat social policy as a whole. 
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of the influence of the early group of reformers may be seen in the failed 
attempt by L. Patras to pass a pension reform law in 1970 during the 
dictatorship15.  The impact of inflation and the concern over short-term issues 
intervened in the 1970s.  When discussion of these issues returned in the 1980s, 
the thread with the original aims of social insurance appears to be lost16, and 
fragmentation is treated as a part of the status quo, ‘a fact of nature’.  
 Nevertheless no pension system can rely exclusively on good intentions.  The 
original law (both in its original form and as reformulated in 1951) foresaw the 
problem and embedded mechanisms to return to stability.  The problem with 
immature PAYG systems is their lack of a budget constraint (Tinios 2005); it is 
the function of regular actuarial reviews to play such a role.  Such reviews were 
foreseen in the original legislation, a requirement repeated in subsequent 
legislation (e.g. L2084/92).  Despite the legislative provision, actuarial reviews 
were seldom undertaken, and when they were, they were simply ignored17. The 
process of ‘promoting immaturity’ kept the wolf away from the door up to the 
early 1980s: the extension of compulsory auxiliary coverage to all employees 
in 1983 was the last major attempt to generate new current surpluses. After 
that, IKA and other funds were structurally unable to cover their current 
expenditure and were forced to resort to banks for short-term lending to finance 
pensions. This state of affairs in 1987 was superseded by the regular payment 
                                                 
15
 That attempt was deemed to have foundered when it was realised that army officers would have to be 
included in the ambit of the reform Sotiropoulos (1999). 
16
 The Spraos report of 1997 (Spraos Committee 1997) was to some extent a conscious return to the 
whistle-blowing tradition. 
17
 Law 2084/92 holds that actuarial reviews are obligatory for every fund every 5 years.  Nevertheless, 
actuarial reviews were typically undertaken only by Separation funds who to increase their payouts.  
No guidelines were ever issued. 
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of government grants to finance pensions (Tinios 2003): today around 30% of 
all pensions are financed by ad hoc government handouts.  This practice 
effectively abolishes the budget constraint to social security by severing any 
link between benefits and income.  As a third is covered by the State anyway, 
any individual benefit increase may be granted independently of finance and 
charged to the State grant. 
The direct involvement of the Government budget turned pension fund 
independence into a fiction, yet upgraded social insurance deficits as key 
determinants of the government deficit.  Government finances became the 
dominant homeostatic mechanism.  This brought to the fore as key actors in 
social insurance reform, international organizations such as the IMF and the 
OECD, and later on the EU (Tinios 2000, 2002).  As their interest focused on 
public finances their viewpoint was by necessity macroscopic.  They treated the 
social insurance system as a unit rather than a collection of independent 
autonomous entities and were instrumental in bringing the matter of 
consolidation to the attention of public opinion18. Nevertheless, little awareness 
was generated as to how the macro-economic financing issues were related to 
micro-operation of social insurance in the separate funds19. 
How did the counteracting influences of centrifugal forces and homeostatic 
mechanisms play out in practice? 
                                                 
18
 Notably by the publication of analyses, e.g. IMF in 1992, OECD in 1998, OECD 2007.  The Open 
Method of Coordination is also part of this process forcing the examination of the system as a whole. 
19
 Indeed, some extra confusion was generated by the operation of the so-called ‘white hole’- the 
accounting mechanism through which the deficit on a public finance basis is transformed into a surplus 
on a cash basis, supposedly through the increase in cash holdings of unnamed social insurance 
institutions and local authorities.  
  13 
‘Ostrich interventionism’ consists of regular episodes of frantic intervention to 
satisfy outside pressures followed by a Nirvana of abandon (Tinios, 2008b). 
Since the early 1990s pension reform episodes go through a number of phases: 
• Pressure builds up outside Greece to ‘do something’ to reduce 
government deficits. 
• Public opinion and the media ‘discover’ an immediate threat to 
pensions, usually voiced into headlines such as ‘Pension Funds are 
sinking’, ‘Pensions under threat’ etc. These headlines may or may not be 
accompanied by data (most frequently demographic projections). 
• ‘Social dialogue’ ensues which lasts a few weeks. The dialogue is 
marked by confusion, strikes in the public utilities and frantic side 
negotiations with separate groups of workers. 
• Laws are passed with great haste. They are hailed as of ‘epochal 
importance’. The laws keep the structure of the system and inch along in 
the direction of the original reform trajectory: somewhat lesser distance 
dividing groups, slightly later retirement ages, and slightly fewer 
exceptions. Such laws were passed in 1992, 1998, 2002 and 200820.  
The unique feature of this process occurs between the reform episodes.  The 
whole system passes into a denial phase, where everyone talks and behaves as 
if there never was a threat to pensions. All processes of reflection are prevented 
                                                 
20
 Where there was meaningful change, which was presented as independent of pension refom:  Means 
testing in 1996 was a (regrettable) necessity imposed by austerity. Changes to banks’ pensions in 2005 
were forced by International Accounting Standards. Both cases were characterised by depth of 
preparation. The banking methodology was subsequently used as a model by the European 
Commission for State Aid cases in the French public sector (Tinios 2010a). 
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and any call to reform is maligned. The example of the Spraos Committee is 
very characteristic of this process (see Featherstone 2001). The treatment of the 
Spraos report meant that it had no emulators.  The same pusillanimity implies 
that no political actors can withstand a possible accusation that they are 
preparing for a pension reform. Consequently, all technical preparations for 
future reforms are prevented. When the call comes from outside to start the 
process afresh, everyone behaves as if a natural catastrophe has struck. Given 
the short institutional memory of the political system, each reform episode is 
treated ‘as if it was the first time’ - an interesting case of Serial Reform 
Virginity. 
The periodicity of this cycle appears to be of the order of 5-6 years, straddling 
two parliamentary terms. The first parliamentary term after a reform episode 
passes by trying to forget and to heal the wounds of the reform. This allows 
sufficient time for pension deficits to build up and leads to the first calls from 
outside to ‘do something’ close to the end of that term.  Exorcism of the issue 
continues past the election (during which pensions are only mentioned in the 
context of increasing as being too low); the post-election government discovers 
to its horror that it must do something to allay outside pressures. 
Giannitsis (2007, p.19) states that pension reform is ‘a tragedy in many acts’. 
The analysis above, in contrast, suggests something closer to repeated 
showings of a popular comic opera. The leading parts are taken by the same 
actors, whose roles are tightly scripted and reactions carefully choreographed. 
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Social dialogues are set to favourite themes, the theatrical exits after pas-de-
deux eagerly awaited. The parliamentary climax and triumphal ministerial 
declarations of eternal salvation bring down the house at the end of each 
performance21.  
The repetition of the show may be attributed to a ‘societé bloqué’.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the plot turned in 1992, 2001 and 2008 almost at the 
same points, while actors tend to stick to their roles, lead to a suspicion that a 
catalyst to give the plot, for once,  a new twist ought to be there – somewhere. 
The predictability of reactions can possibly be stage-managed in such a way, as 
to produce a new play with a different ending.  
The fault may not be with the actors, but with the play. The failure of reform 
lies in the preparation and contents of the reform package and not in the 
violence of reactions to it22. 
 
3. Taking Stock: do we need a new pension reform agenda? 
The 75th anniversary of social insurance in October 2009 will find the country 
with a pension reform law which is barely 18 months old. The Minister of 
Employment had in March 2008 declared that the ‘problem was solved for a 
                                                 
21
 Featherstone and Tinios (2006) relate how the interests of key actors (Government, Unions, 
Employers, finance, the policy community, cadres of pension funds) lead to a policy log-jam. The 
possession of an electoral system with strong parliamentary majority is not sufficient to guarantee that 
change can occur (Triantafyllou 2006). Matsaganis (2007) looks at the role of unions.  Mossialos and 
Allin (2006) look at the related issue of health care reforms. 
22
 This analysis of pensions concurs with Monastiriotis and Antoniades (2009) view that it is the quality 
of reforms that is largely to blame for their failure, and not vested interests. 
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generation’. In the face of calls for more reform, it is pertinent to ask “Which 
problem was solved?”. Fragmentation of the system and fragmentation of 
control implies that pension reform may be interpreted or misinterpreted in 
three ways: 
1. As a redistribution between generations, viz. as an actuarial issue.  To 
correct this, one must look at the very long term and attempt to deal with 
debt dynamics. This viewpoint should interest the contributor who is 
concerned with providing for his/her old age. 
2. As a redistribution within a generation, viz. as a public finance issue 
centred on the question of ‘who pays for pensions?’.  Thus, a medium 
term perspective is favoured and the focus is on the Public sector deficit. 
This is the viewpoint naturally adopted by the Ministries of Finance. 
3. As a redistribution of political influence, a question relating to the 
day-to-day governance of the system. Fragmented laws in over-
determined systems demand constant attention; overlapping laws and 
jurisdictions necessitate frequent direct political intervention. This very 
short term perspective naturally interests those entrusted with operating 
the system – viz. pension fund managements and the Ministry of 
Employment which supervises them. 
The last attempt at reform (Law 3655/08) was clearly oriented towards (3) and 
left the other two concerns unanswered. The law could be seen as a direct 
reaction to the fallout of the 2006 scandal of exorbitant fees charged to pension 
  17 
funds for investments in derivatives, during which the Minister of Finance 
famously bemoaned the existence of ‘clueless management teams’  in funds. 
Given that no political actor dared to mention factors other than day-to-day 
control issues, one cannot but agree with the Minister’s statement regarding the 
particular solution to that pension problem. However, it is also true to say that 
issues 1 and 2 relating to intergenerational and public finance concerns were 
untouched. They remain to be discovered by future instalments of reform.  
It is thus appropriate to persist with the question that was so deftly dodged by 
ignoring the two anniversaries mentioned at the start of this paper: if we take 
the long view, how far along are with the implementation of the original IKA 
vision? 
Given the preceding discussion, it will come as no surprise to claim that the 
1930s project is, in major respects, still pending: 
• The original 1930s intention was that the statement ‘We are being folded 
into IKA’ would have the meaning of relief and satisfaction. Instead, in 
2009 it is most often used as a call to arms – as in some of the strikes in 
2008 or in the context of banking pension reforms in 2005. 
• In many ways the system is more fragmented than the situation at the 
outset. Fragmentation within organisational entities –fragmentation in 
insurance terms– is in some ways more damaging to economic 
efficiency than fragmentation in bureaucracy. 
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• Some of the second best solutions over the decades have compromised 
the original design in salient ways. For example, the original intention 
was clearly to deal with old age poverty by encouraging long 
contribution periods. Indeed a full career will lead to replacement rates 
comparable with those in the EU. Sharply raising minimum pensions (as 
was done between 1978 and 1985) dealt with the immediate problem but 
undermined the central philosophy of the original legislation23. 
Similarly, basing health care on a National Health Service severed the 
link between short and long term benefits. 
• The system is increasingly moving away from self-financing. The State 
provides any shortfall between revenue and expenditure and has become 
the ultimate provider of all benefits. The courts take an equivalent 
position judging a variety of cases independently of economic logic or 
budget constraints. 
Looking at the content of pension reform discussions, they proceed as if 
pension reform is a basket whose contents are fixed and unalterable.  Reform is 
mentioned and treated as an amorphous whole, as if there can be no argument 
of what it is to comprise and no strategic choices to be made. Concrete 
proposals usually turn out to be simple parametric changes around a given 
system.  Most ‘proposals’ amount to demands for a free lunch:  curbing 
contribution evasion, reimbursement for foregone earnings due to the 
                                                 
23
 Given that 70% receive the minimum pension the system collects revenue as social insurance and 
pays out benefits as a welfare system (Tinios (2001).  This provision acts as a massive evasion 
incentive. 
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misappropriation of social security surpluses. Those who dare to propose 
something draw from a fixed menu of measures: consolidation into fewer 
funds, raising of retirement ages, abolition of the most glaring privileges (e.g. 
Heavy and Unhygienic Occupations), changes to the gender bias.  It is 
interesting that the changes are always enumerated and never evaluated. 
Everyone appears to know what needs to be done, so that concrete changes are 
never discussed nor alternatives weighed. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
the proposals, at their most daring, amount simply to the completion of the 
1930s project which, apparently, constitutes the maximum of their ambition.  
A crucial ingredient of this style of ‘discussion’ is that the rhetoric of reform is 
divorced from the content of the reform. Demographic changes are brought 
along to motivate the discussion but their role ends there: to justify the passage 
of the same package of measures irrespective of the size of the challenge. For 
example, in 2001/2 the UK Government Actuary Department’s (GAD) 
projections24 of the demographic implications on pension expenditure were 
released, but were totally ignored afterwards; the measures proposed and 
implemented by the then government were not measured against the size of the 
challenge. Even more tellingly in 2007 the Government ordered new 
projections from the ILO, yet completed its own reform before it had even 
received them25. The 2007 government faced with the imminent retirement of 
the baby boom failed to promote the same reform package its predecessors in 
                                                 
24
 These projections formed the basis of the 2002 EPC projections of expenditure to 2050 and are still 
in 2009 the most current measure of pension sustainability (Ministry of Employment 2001). 
25
 Once received, and consistent with the model proposed in this paper, these projections were ignored 
and not discussed by anyone from either the government or the opposition.  
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the late ‘80s (faced with a far more benign demographic picture) had similarly 
failed to promote. 
Each government in turn appears to work via a ‘satisficing’ model (to borrow a 
term from Herbert Simon), where it proceeds along the given path as far as it 
can. It does as much as it can in the implicit knowledge that it will fall a long 
way short of where it needs to go. Overshooting the target is implicitly 
considered impossible, as reformers feel they are doing less than what is 
needed. We just struggle along, doing the best we can. The questions of 
whether the direction itself is appropriate or whether it needs adjusting are 
never posed. 
If the analysis above is correct, even if by some miracle the full programme of 
pension reform as formulated –in the most daring dream of reform proponents- 
was implemented immediately, we would still be left with a pension system 
designed in the early 1930s on the basis of know-how that is three quarters of a 
century old. Would such a model be appropriate for 2050 and later on? 
The question can be broken into two components: 
(a) Would the ‘full-1930s system’ be viable?  Though it would certainly be 
a vast improvement on current arrangements, the answer is probably that 
it would not be viable. Sample calculations by GAD (Ministry of 
Employment 2001, Tinios 2003) indicate that the sheer size of the 
parametric changes to equilibrate the current system defy belief. Even 
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so, rapid changes to the social contract could mean major gains in public 
finance, some gain in economic efficiency, but are likely to have a 
hugely negative knock-on effect on loss of credibility and erosion of 
trust to a system. 
(b) Would the ‘full-1930s system’ be appropriate?  The 1930s model is 
exclusively a social insurance system, where rights-based benefits sit 
uncomfortably. Social welfare is not easily integrated into that structure, 
at a time when it acquires more significance. In the 1930s it was 
reasonable to assume that firms will be longer lived than individuals 
who could thus plan their careers around a single job, and that passive 
help for unemployed was sufficient. Very little attention was paid to 
gender issues. Finally, in the context of the 1930s there was very little 
alternative to a monolithic State provision. PAYG finance allocates all 
risk one-sidedly to the working generation and eschews any benefits of 
diversification.  
Thus, should the question ever be put, a simple revamping of the traditional 
1930s-style State is unlikely to be thought as an answer to 21st century 
concerns. Indeed, it is telling that in the majority of countries where pension 
reform was seriously discussed, some variant of a multi-pillar system was 
preferred. In the context of Greece, rebasing pension discussion would appear 
the best way to break out of the log-jam of syncopated ostrich-interventionism. 
Parametric pension reform fails because it creates many opponents and can 
mobilise few supporters. At best, what it can offer is the orderly management 
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of decline by instituting a process whose destination, however, is already 
devalued in the mind of contributors. Reform by instalments reneges on the 
social contract without offering a new one.  Saying, for instance, that ‘we have 
solved the pension problem for 15 years’ (as is wont of Ministers of Economy) 
is sure to alienate the majority of contributors who hope to draw benefits after 
that period. It imposes costs without apparently generating any benefits in the 
form of greater security (Featherstone and Tinios, 2006)26. 
The need thus emerges for a fresh start. The total distance to be covered 
depends on ‘objective’ features of the way pensions are linked to the economy, 
and is ultimately independent of the number of instalments; there exists no 
‘magic  bullet’ that can secure adjustment without changes in individual 
behaviour. To present pension reform as a whole, rather than as a series of 
disconnected steps, would allow (future) gains to counterbalance (current) pain. 
An overall pension strategy could thus allay fears more convincingly and can 
plan to overcome the kinds of opposition that have stalled attempts to date. 
What would a fresh start look like? Its beginning would be by rebasing pension 
discussion in order to win over younger contributors, who will be called to bear 
the brunt of the future adjustments. Such a discussion would need to centre 
around the allocation of risk, and to incorporate social security in such as a way 
                                                 
26
 The reactions to the Giannitsis’ proposals in 2001 could be interpreted in this way.  The apparent 
successes of the 2002 and 2008 ‘reforms’ were due to their lack of ambition, as evidenced by the 
almost immediate call for new reforms. It is significant that now, Giannitsis (2007) accepts that 2001 
was the last chance to implement parametric reforms and that conditions now necessitate more radical 
change. 
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as to help and not hinder economic development27. Barr and Diamond (2008) 
and Myles (2002) stress the importance of high growth and high productivity 
for the sustainability of social insurance. Both factors, as well as a Lewis-type 
dual growth caused by internal migration, were present in the formative years 
of social insurance in the 1950s and 1960s. Such conditions have ceased to 
hold, however, at least since the 1970s.  Nevertheless, the current system is so 
dysfunctional in microeconomic terms, that its abandonment will have a 
positive impact effect. Apart from that negative observation, it is possible to 
speculate on the kind of features that a functional system to replace the 
antiquated 1930s model could have. Depending on priorities, one can envisage 
models that place greater emphasis on poverty prevention and others that focus 
more on income replacement, as well as shifting the monolithic emphasis on 
state provision.  
One model that would appear to fit the bill and whose characteristics are well 
understood is the ‘Notional Defined Contribution’ (NDC) System first applied 
in Sweden but also introduced successfully in Italy (Holzmann and Palmer, 
2006)28.  In any case, the lessons of failure in Greece, and of success elsewhere, 
is that the key lies in careful preparation. This involves thinking through the 
characteristics of the reform and the administrative prerequisites; presenting the 
arguments for change is also critical. Otherwise, clinging to a familiar (if 
                                                 
27
 Positive feedback loops between social insurance and industrial development were a key feature of 
the 1960s (Tinios 2003; 2008) at a time of rapid population and productivity growth. The challenge is 
to find new feedback loops today. 
28
 Nektarios (2008) explores the implementation in Greece. Without altering the fundamental 
mathematics of PAYG social insurance the NDC system gives the impression of a fresh start.  Costing 
of the proposal was undertaken by GAD (Ministry of Employment 2001). 
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moribund) 75-year system would once again be judged preferable to the 
alternative. 
 
4. In conclusion 
In 2009/10 a new reform episode is looming.  Initial post-election complacency 
was succeeded by increasing stridency, as ‘the markets’ held the country in a 
vice. Is this Ostrich-interventionism with a vengeance, or can it be the final act 
of the tragedy? 
In February 2010 it is too early to say. In the markets’ attack on Greece, 
pension reform probably plays an important role. When one compares Greece 
with Italy, both countries have a bloated public sector, a huge National Debt 
and abysmal demographic prospects. Yet, only Greece (to date) is the object of 
attention. A possible explanation: Italy, having implemented a pension reform 
in 1996, can offer ‘a story’ of how demographic deterioration will be tackled.  
Greece, in contrast, has no such thing; politicians thought 2030 was too far 
away to worry. In previous bouts of pension reform (1992, 2002, even 2008) 
such a viewpoint was allowed to pass, largely because what was happening in 
Greece was thought of peripheral interest. In 2009, though, Greece was 
perceived as the Achilles’ heel of the euro; the Greek National Debt became a 
test case of the stability of the Eurozone as a whole. Nervous bond markets 
focused on what was happening in Greece; their attention had the effect of 
telescoping future unease to the immediate present.  If this reading is correct, to 
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let go they need to be told something to put their fears to rest. And that can 
only be pension reform. Taking up, once again, the analogy of the comic opera: 
Greek pensions were playing in provincial theatres in front of indulgent 
audiences, many of whom were directly related to the cast29. The provincial 
troupe was suddenly catapulted centre stage at the Milan Scala, attempting to 
satisfy discerning and sceptical critics. 
So, a ‘pension reform’ we will certainly have in 2010.  Will it galvanise the 
opposition to all adjustment, as it did in 2001, or will the sense of national 
crisis prevail on citizens to pull together? Those general questions will depend 
a good deal on the characteristics of that reform: Will that pension reform be 
worthy of the name, or will the need for haste promote something that will only 
have to be undone later?  
Either scenario is feasible. What is certain is that Greeks are finally waking up 
to the wisdom of ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to 
change’ (Giuseppe di Lampedusa  The Leopard, 1957). 
 
 
                                                 
29
 The benefits of being in the periphery were evident in the cases of the two stabilisation loans 
received by Greece in 1985 (from the IMF) and 1990 (from the EU). In both cases Greece claimed only 
the first instalment, largely because it had not fulfilled the conditions for receiving the second one.   
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Appendix I. The last Instalment: A Strategic Framework for Pension 
Reform 
This writer, in a proposal presented in autumn 2009 (Tinios 2009), argued that 
to break out of the cycle of syncopated reforms it is essential to aim at a 
definitive system fixed for a generation30. Since then, the public finance crisis 
created a sense of urgency, possibly even panic, but also conflated short-term 
features with long-term issues. A pension reform, whilst addressing immediate 
concerns, should aim to secure for itself the serenity to ponder solutions that 
will still be there 40-50 years on. Such changes cannot be prepared overnight 
nor can they be accepted and digested without a period of reflection31. 
If the analysis of this paper is correct, the chief problems that the well-
intentioned reformer will face in 2010 are the lack of preparation, the non-
existence of administrative prerequisites and the dearth of implementable ideas. 
Policy thus faces a critical dilemma:  proceed with reforms with are 
insufficiently prepared and risk being overturned, or miss a unique opportunity 
for meaningful reform? The answer to the dilemma is to realize that reform 
does not necessarily have to be legislated in one go in 2010. What is essential is 
to announce a phased programme, which after a given period of gestation, leads 
to a definitive ‘last instalment’ embodying a fresh start. To put in place a 
convincing reform package, it would be sufficient to pursue a strategy in two 
and a half phases:  
                                                 
30
 A more detailed analysis on those lines is under preparation to appear in book form in early 2010. 
31
 A further problem is that a good many measures may have a negative impact effect (which is later 
reversed.  That is no reason, however, for not implementing them. 
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(a) The Immediate phase would involve corrective measures with immediate 
public finance impact and would show determination to solve the problem as a 
whole, and not ‘as much as we can bear’. Such measures could be sought 
among parametric proposals which meet no serious objections. Such would be 
a consolidation of the Civil Service arrangements, measures for the Seamen’s 
Fund NAT, consolidation on the revenue side, implementation of the Heavy 
&Hazardous Occupations proposals, capping pensions at 100% of final salary 
and possibly other measures. Of vital importance would be the arrangements 
for studying and proposing the definitive phase32, whose function would be to 
signal that the matter is not being left to its fate. 
 (b) The Definitive phase cannot come before 2-3 years’ time, when the “Last 
Instalment” would be legislated.  This legislation should offer a full blueprint 
for the long term, a detailed description of the adjustment period and an Action 
Plan for implementation of accompanying administrative actions and ensuring 
the existence of smooth operation of the required logistical infrastructure. The 
new arrangements must be designed (as was IKA originally) to last for 2 
generations at least – i.e. to carry the system well into the 2050s. 
(c) The Interim phase. The period intervening between the two bouts of 
legislation (the ½ phase) must be devoted to an intensive study of needs to be 
met and means to meet them. Though it is true to say that there exists no 
‘magic bullet’, in the sense that people will have to revise their expectations 
                                                 
32
 To this effect, temporary measures may be implemented – such as a temporary levy on pensions –   
to be rescinded once the definitive phase is legislated.  In that way, there would be something to gain 
by the conclusion of discussions. 
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and plans, the feeling of many experts is that NDC will probably form a good 
part of the ultimate answer. However, that remains to be proven, which can 
only be done if all alternatives are studied, costed and their pros and cons aired 
and discussed. 
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Appendix II. A brief chronology of Social security in Greece 
Period Landmarks Key characteristic 
Inter war Period League of Nations Committee proposes version 
of Czech system 
Law 5733/ 1932 leads to fall of two Gov’ts 
(E.Venizelos an A.Papanastasiou). 
1934 Popular Party passes   law 6298 «On 
Social Insurance», after compromise. 
1937 implementation of Law by the Metaxas 
Dictatorship. ΙΚΑ begins operations  December 
1937 
Formulation of the “IKA vision” 
the model of development for 
social protection in Greece.  
Based on (a) IKA as pole of 
attraction and (b) gradual 
absorption of preexisting funds.  
1950s ΙΚΑ  restarted by  Law1846/51 
Compulsory deposits of fund surpluses in the 
bank of Greece ( Law 1611/50). 
First reports outlining need for reform. 
Gradual implementation  and 
spread of the postwar model  
Implementation of decisions 
taken in the 1930s 
1960s 1962  Farmers’ Fund (OGA) set up. 
1964 Decision not to levy contributions in OGA  
1966 Public Power Corporation disaffiliates 
from IKA 
1969 L. Patras reform in the dictatorship 
collapses 
Start of revisions to  and 
departures  from IKA vision. 
First intimations of difficulties 
of reforms.  
 
1970s 1972/3- The system faces the challenges of 
inflation.  Pensions’ erosion. Emphasis on social 
role of minimum pension. 
Expansion at the intensive margin (setting up of 
auxiliary fund ETEAM L 997/79). 
Search for a social role of the 
social insurance system. Ad hoc 
solutions tamper with central 
philosophy of social insurance. 
Overall reform forgotten. 
1980s Acceleration of rises in mimimum pensions 
Large deficits in Funds from 1980 
National Health Service changes role of social 
insurance and transfers health deficits to the 
State budget.  
Search for structural changes to 
correct current deficits.  
‘Social Insurance impasses’ and 
reform difficulties 
 
1990s Emergency measures 1990/2, motivated by 
public finance.   
Ν2084/92 «offers new lease to the system» 
Permanent changes pre-announced for the 
future. 
1996 EKAS is the first means tested benefit. 
1997 Spraos Report shocks public opinion 
«Solution of pension problem» 
becomes a permanent issue in 
political economy. 
Beginning of awareness of 
demographic deterioration. 
Old age poverty becomes 
concern 
2000s (a) 2001/2 PASOK attempt: GAD projections/ 
Giannitsis Debacle/ Reppas Law 3029 (2002) 
announces future measures 
(b) 2006  Derivatives scandal leads to 2007/8 
ND attempt:  ILO Projections ordered/ Law 
3665 Deals with administrative issues. 
(c) ????? 
‘Reform by Instalments 
entrenched’ 
 
“Ostrich-interventionism” 
 
EMU entry ‘europeanises’ 
problem. 
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